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ABSTRACT
The growth of large firms that integrated production and distribution in
the late nineteenth-century U.S. has been chronicled often, most recently by
Alfred Chandler. The historical literature, with its emphasis on the
integration of production and distribution, has not been amenable to formal
economic analysis using the traditional tools of industrial organization..
This paper draws on the literature about prices vs. quantities and
transaction costs to derive a simple model of firm integration under
conditions of economies of scale in production and uncertainty in marketing.
The model then is used to analyze the managerial revolution before World War
One.
*
Helpful comments were received from Peter Diamond, Paul Joskow, and Martin
Weitzman. All errors remain mine.
Digitized by the Internet Archive
in 2011 with funding from
Boston Library Consortium Member Libraries
http://www.archive.org/details/modelofmanageriaOOtemi
- 1 -
1 . The Problem
The transformation of American industry in the late nineteenth century-
is typified by the career of Andrew Carnegie. By the end of the Civil War,
Carnegie was a wealthy man with a variety of interrelated interests. He
expressed these interests by owning major shares in a variety of different
firms: blast furnaces, a rail mill, a fast-freight company, a locomotive
works, a bridge-building firm, a sleeping-car company, and others. He
consolidated all of his holdings into the Carnegie Steel Co. in the 1870s
when he began to exploit the new Bessemer steelmaking technology. Thereafter
he exercised his considerable entrepreneurial and managerial talents within a
single organization. (Wall, 1970)
As with Carnegie, so with Duke, Swift, and myriad other industrialists
whose names live on today in the names of firms, philanthropic foundations,
and educational institutions. While their predecessors had spread their
talents over several organizations, the scale of some business firms had
expanded enough by the late nineteenth century to engage their full
attention. These firms produced, packaged, advertised and sold a product
that often was new to the market. Contemporary observers like Charles
Francis Adams and Louis D. Brandeis recorded their horror of these firms in
tracts like Chapters of Eric and Other People's Money . The Muckrakers
detailed the accusations against the new large firms and their leaders, the
"robber barons."
A revisionist literature has grown up in more recent years, as the
generation that lived through the managerial revolution disappeared.
Typified by Nevins' magisterial biographies, this literature portrayed the
"robber barons" as progressive industrialists interested only in efficiency
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and progress. This line of research has been summarized and synthesized by
Alfred Chandler in his The Visible Hand (1977). Chandler sees the growth of
large integrated firms as the response to profit opportunities opened up by
new technologies. While there were many different innovations, Chandler
sees most of them as parts of a unified change that drastically increased the
volume of products produced and the ease with which they could be marketed to
consumers. It was the combination of these two changes— in production and in
distribution—that led to the rise of the large, vertically integrated
industrial firm.
Chandler presented his views in a narrative format. In keeping with the
literature on which he drew, he constructed his intellectual edifice by
piling one anecdotal brick on another. This process resulted in a classic
and convincing story, but it did not render the underlying argument amenable
to formal analysis.
The narrative, in fact, tends to discuss the actual historical events
with a kind of inevitability. There obviously were choices to be made, but
the alternatives were not spelled out and evaluated. Instead, the choice
actually made was assumed to be the proper one and described in detail. The
growth and longevity of large firms suggests that many managerial choices
were in fact made reasonably, but they do not give insight into the nature of
the choice itself. The question is not whether Andrew Carnegie was
successful; the question is why.
¥e need a model of the choice faced by late nineteenth-century
industrialists to answer this question. The model should rank the
alternatives under different initial conditions and provide a way to explain
the extent of vertical integration we observe. The model to be presented
here is firmly in the efficiency tradition and takes little notice of
horizontal integration for the purpose of increasing market power. This is
not to suggest that such activities were absent, only that they are not the
focus of the present inquiry. This model applies to industries where
"vertical integration and oligopoly preceded horizontal combination and
monopoly." (Yeager, 1981, p. 242)
Section II describes the events to be explained in more detail. The
model is derived in Section III and used to illuminate the managerial
revolution in Section IV. Section V draws some implications and conclusions
from the preceding discussion.
II. The Events to be Explained
Alfred Chandler chronicles what he calls the managerial revolution in
American business in The Visible Hand . The relevant part of his story for
this discussion is his Part IV, entitled, "The Integration of Mass Production
with Mass Distribution." This, briefly, is the event to be explained.
Chandler distinguishes three types of industries that participated in
this revolution. The first type included industries with new continuous-
process manufacturing methods. Economies of scale in production in these
industries led to a vast increase in the quantity of the product produced
with an attendant fall in the price. In order to effect this dramatic move
down demand curve for their products, producers had to integrate distribution
with production. The second type of industry produced a perishable product.
These firms needed to integrate distribution with production to ensure that
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the product did not spoil before it reached the consumer. The third type of
industry produced a product needing service after it was sold. Producers
needed to integrate production and distribution, according to Chandler, to
keep their products operating and thereby to keep up the demand for new
products . ,
The question is not whether the distributional functions described by
Chandler needed to be done. It is perfectly clear that someone had to do
them. The question is why producers thought that it was preferable to
integrate distribution services with production rather than purchase them on
the market, that is, rather than let independent firms distribute the
products. This question can be made clearer by a brief examination of a few
of Chandler's examples. Each example is typical of the industry type to
which it belongs.
The American Tobacco Company was formed in 1890 as the result of events
set in motion by James B. Duke in 1884 when he installed two continous-
production cigarette-making machines capable of "saturating" the then
existing cigarette market. "Output soared. Selling became the challenge."
(ibid,, p. 291) The question here is what the actual challenge was. Price
reduction, which accompanied the expansion of output (partly due to a fall in
the cigarette tax), must have increased the quantity demanded. Apparently
the quantity demanded at the price at which Duke wanted to sell was still not
enough to absorb his output, and he advertised to shift the demand curve
outward. But getting consumers interested was only part of the challenge;
Duke had also to get cigarettes to stores where the consumers could buy them.
He did this by establishing "a network of sales offices" that coordinated
local advertising and the scheduling of shipments to "jobbers and a few large
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retailers." The sales offices did not actually act as wholesalers or
retailers; they signed "marketing agreements with wholesalers and
retailers." (ibid.)
What were the sales offices doing? Chandler reports in a general
discussion that "the wholesaler could not be relied upon to order and
maintain inventory so that the customer could be always sure of obtaining the
product." (Ibid., p. 290) The sales offices informed wholesalers of this
need and, presumably, signed contracts with them obligating them to keep
adequate inventories.
The question is why a price signal would not have done as well. If we
are to trust the judgment of earlier entrepreneurs, these sales offices were
not needed before. ¥hat had changed? If wholesalers or retailers ran short,
they would lose sales. It was in their interest to be well-stocked. Yet the
implication of Chandler's narrative is that a price signal was not as
effective as a quantity signal from a local sales office. A further
implication of Chandler's description is that full integration was not used
by the new continuous-process manufacturers; they needed to do more than
simply announce the availability of their product at a market price, but less
than integrate forward into wholesaling or retailing. They did, however,
take over the function of advertising their product from the wholesalers or
retailers.
The growth of Swift & Co. provides an example of a firm making a
perishable product. Swift "became the first modern meat packer because he
was the first to appreciate the need for a distribution network to store meat
and deliver it to the retailers." (ibid., pp. 299-300) The introduction of
the refrigerated railroad car enabled meat to be slaughtered at a central
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location and shipped as dressed meat to the point of retail sale. The
conditions under which the meat was stored and transported clearly had to he
controlled carefully to avoid spoilage. But railroads refused to handle
refrigerated cars in an attempt to retain their existing traffic in live
animals. And the wholesalers, who also handled live meat before the
introduction of refrigerated cars, boycotted the new refrigerated dressed
meat. Swift consequently had to do his own distribution and wholesaling.
Swift integrated forward further than Duke. Other firms producing
perishable products, such as brewers, did likewise, even without the
opposition from existing conveyers and wholesalers that faced Swift. ¥hile
continuous-process manufacturers took over advertising and the coordination
of wholesaling, the producers of perishable products also brought the
wholesaling function into the producing firm.
As with continuous-process manufacturing, the question is why
independent firms could not have provided the services taken over by Swift
and others. The producers could have introduced a differential pricing
scheme, giving discounts to wholesalers who kept the meat well. Publicizing
the discount and having one or two people per city to check on meat delivered
to retail butchers presumably would have created market incentives for
wholesalers to preserve the freshness of dressed meat.
A final example, from an industry selling a product requiring ser^/ice
after purchase, is furnished by the Singer Sewing Machine Company. As far
back as 1859, Singer had retail stores with female demonstrators, (male)
mechanics, and a manager who arranged credit purchases. These stores
coexisted with other forms of distribution until the 1870's when Singer's
successor as president of the firm decided to eliminate all other forms of
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marketing. Independent agencies, according to Chandler, had trouble
supplying marketing services, replenished inventories erratically, and did
not pay their hills to Singer promptly. Instead of paying more to hire a
better class of retailer, the Singer company decided to integrate forward to
handle all its retail sales.
Singer could have offered discounts to firms that supplied high-quality
service, kept adequate inventories, and paid bills on time. The
question is why integration was preferable so that the integrated firm
achieved the success that it did. Why was it that direct control was more
efficient than communication through the market?
The story as told by Chandler has all the inevitability of good history.
Yet it is the obligation of the economist to visualize alternatives. And it
is embarrassingly easy to visualize market alternatives to the forward
integration described by Chandler. ¥e need a model of distribution to show
why one alternative was preferred to the other and to show why the makers of
products requiring customer services integrated further than firms producing
perishable products who in turn integrated further than continuous-process
manufacturers.
III. The Model
Consider the problem facing the producer of a new product by a high-
volume production method. The "new" product can be a genuinely new product
(sewing machines, elevators), an adaptation of an existing product to a new
market (roll photographic film for use by amateurs, ready-to-eat breakfast
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cereals), or a dramatic decline in costs that enables a previously existing
product to marketed in a wholly new way (cigarettes, matches, soap). The
important point is that the "new" product is being sold at an unfamiliar
point on the demand curve, about which there is considerable uncertainty.
Intrinsic novelty of the physical object is not relevant here.
The problem faced by this producer is how to market his "new" product.
In sharp contrast to the normal economic model, we assume that this problem
is equal in importance to the problems in production. The producer has both
to inform potential customers about the existance of his new product and to
market the product to them. These two functions—advertising and
diatribution--may be done together or separately, but they both must be done.
The problem facing the producer is whether to do them himself, that is,
within his own firm, or whether to work through other firms. If he chooses
the latter course, he then has to choose whether to work through a quantity-
based contracting arrangement or through a price-based market system.
More formally, we can divide the producer's choices into four categories.
(Williamson, 1981, pp. 1553-54) He can distribute his product by one of the
following methods:
a) independent wholesalers and retailers that purchase products from
the producer on the open market and resell them,
B) independent wholesalers and retailers that have a franchise or other
contractual arrangement with the producing firm,
C) branch offices of the producing firm for wholesaling and independent
retailers
,
D) branch offices of the producing firm for both wholesaling and
retailing.
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Assume that the producer has the simplest possible cost function. His
high-volume plant produces a fixed, large amount of the product, Q, for a
fixed cost, P. Marginal costs are zero up to Q. In the short run, the
producer cannot produce more than Q and does not wish to produce less. Given
a price, p, for his product, the producer's profits, B, are the following
function of the quantity demanded, q ,
:
(1 ) B = P^d
- ^ for q_j < Q
pQ - F for q.^ > Q
In this simple model, unsatisfied customers are assumed to wait
patiently for new supplies, so there is no cost—other than forgone earnings
— to an excess demand. Nevertheless, the producer will not want to forgo
these earnings if he can avoid it. Since he is the sole producer of a "new"
product, he faces a downward-sloping demand curve. On the assumption that
marginal revenue is positive at Q, he will try to set p to make Q the
quantity demanded.
Setting the price in this context is far from trivial. By definition,
the producer is dealing with an unfamiliar demand curve or an unfamiliar part
of the demand curve. Neither he nor anyone else has experience with the
demand for his "new" product, and his estimate of the demand curve must be
conjectural. In addition, the demand curve may be a function of his actions
in setting quality levels and advertising. The producer is working on a 33
t
of hypotheses that he may well not be able to communicate convincingly to
others, either because they do not know the new product as intimately as he
does or because they are more timorous in their approach to economic
endeavors. And as noted, his projection of demand may be conditional on
advertising and marketing activities that exist initially only in his mind.
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Figure 1
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Again, he may not be able to communicate his vision of the interaction of
production and distribution to others.
Nevertheless, the producer needs to consider the costs of advertising
and marketing in figuring his profits. These costs need to be deducted from
B to get the net profitability to the producer of making and selling his
product. It is convenient to consider these expenses separately from the
production costs here, so that B can be seen as the "benefit" from production
and the costs of advertising and marketing as the "costs." The producer then
seeks to maximize his net profit, or the difference between his "benefit" and
his "costs." His problem is to induce distributors to handle Q units of his
product. The question is whether communication by means of quantities or by
means of prices is a better method of accomplishing this goal.
Let advertising expenses be a fixed expense, A, independent of the
quantity supplied. Distribution costs are assumed to be fixed per unit
without any capacity constraint. That is, either the producer can hire an
unlimited number of people at a constant wage to distribute his product or he
can arrange for an unlimited number of independent firms to market his
product at a given price. This wage or price may have to be quite high to
induce people to handle a new product and to explore a new portion of the
demand curve; it is a mistake to think of it as a simple competitive wage.
There are also start-up costs for distribution, but they are assumed to be
small relative to F. Since distributors handle different geographic areas,
it is appropriate to think of several distributors for each producer for each
producer and to include these start-up costs in the per-unit distribution
cost.
This distribution cost can be expressed as a markup, m, on each unit of
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the product. It must be less than the price to make marketing the product
worthwhile. The producer's advertising and distribution costs therefore
are:
(2) C = A + mq, , where m < p.
In fact, C must be less than B at Q for the product to be produced. The
producer must be able to make positive net profits at his maximum output for
him to even consider producing. Using (I ) and (2):
A+mQ < pQ-F
(3) A+F < (p-m)Q
Total fixed costs must be less than average net revenue times maximum
production.
Like p, m is an unknown parameter at the outset. The producer cannot
know with certainty how much marketing will cost. The cost will include
payments needed to attract people into the distribution of this new and
untried product as well as the direct costs of people's time. That is, it
includes a risk premium in addition to a wage. The size of this risk premium
is subject to uncertainty, although it presumably declines over time as the
product becomes less "new."
The B and C functions are shown in Figure 1 . The maximum distance
between B and C is reached at Q. This is the position of maximum profit to
the producer. The slope of B is not defined at Q, but the graph shows that B
is "more curved" at Q than C. More precisely, a smooth approximation to B
would show more curvature in a neighborhood of Q than would a similar
approximation to C. As shown by ¥eitzman (1974), a quantity signal from
producer to distributor would be preferred as a result. In fact, the
advantage of a quantity signal over a price signal increases as the curvature
- 15
of C decreases (given that B is the more curved of the two).
This clearly makes sense. If a price signal were used to communicate
with the distributors, the producer could easily find that a small variation
in the signal could have a dramatic adverse effect on his profits. The
producer's price to distributors is (p-m). If the producer sets (p-m) too
high, that is, if he sets m too low, then distributors may refuse to handle
his product, resulting in few or no sales. And if he sets (p-m) too low,
then he has transferred profits to his distributors unnecessarily. Since the
shape of his cost curve pushes the producer toward a fixed quantity of
production, he does better to arrange for distribution of this quantity
directly than to send out a price signal that will induce others to
distribute just this amount.
This reasoning does not fully characterize the situation in which there
are many possible distributors. In that case, price signals have advantages
that may offset the advantage of quantity arrangements deriving from the
curvature of the cost and benefit curves. Using price signals, the producer
can let the market winnow out the high-cost distributors in favor of their
more efficient or better-placed competitors; he does not have to choose
among them himself. The above reasoning therefore applies most where there
are special requirements for efficient distribution that cannot be satisfied
by random distributors. It might require special training (to be a
repairman, for example) or special equipment (refrigerated cars) to do a good
job distributing the new product. In either case, a distributor possessing
the relevant human or physical capital would be a better distributor than one
who did not. The producer therefore would not be willing to distribute
through anyone who would pay (p-m) for his product; he would want to use only
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those people he knew had and would use properly the necessary tools and .
skills.
Some of these needed skills may be quite general, even if not generally
available in the late nineteenth century. It was assumed above that
unsatisfied customers waited patiently for new supplies. But if the producer
is launching a massive advertising campaign to convince potential consumers
to try his new product, the success of this advertising may depend on the
product being available at the same time. (Producers complained often about
the problem of keeping their goods in stock at the wholesale or retail
level.) If existing distributors lack the skills to keep their inventories
replenished, the producer may want to deal only with those few who have these
administrative skills or else—as will be discussed shortly—integrate
forward to supply these skills himself.
Since it matters under these circumstances who the distributor is, the
producer will be interested in the distributor's identity as well as his
willingness to pay (p-m) for the (undistributed) product. He will be willing
to distribute only through a small n\imber of known organizations. In
Williamson's (1979) terminology, the transaction between producer and
distributor is idiosyncratic. (in Ben-Porath's (1980) terminology, it is an
F-connection.)
¥e can conclude from this exercise that there are two circumstances in
which producers will want to have quantity controls on distribution;
1
)
Where the product is so "new" that it is hard to know what the
correct (p-m) would be to sell Q of the product at lowest cost.
2) Where distribution involves an idiosyncratic transaction, that is,
where the requirements of distribution are such that there exists an entry
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cost to efficient distribution of the product and the number of potential
distributers is limited as a result.
Given the choice of quantity controls, the producer still has to choose
between a contractual arrangement and complete integration of production and
distribution. (Flaherty, 1981) Both of the factors just listed are important
in this choice as well. Newness promotes integration for several reasons.
It may be hard to convince distributors to handle a new and untried product.
The producer may understand that this product is desirable, plentiful and
cheap, but he may find it hard to convince distributors that he can convince
consumers that his product has these attributes. The distributor may not be
willing or able to ensure that his inventories do not run out. It may be
easier for the producer to take the risk of failure on himself, rather than
to educate an independent distributor enough to get him to share it. He may
find it easier to hire individuals, who are then liable only for the
performance of their job, than to contract with firms, who have their
organizations at risk as well.
In addition, even if the producer can convince the distributors of the
merits of his new product, they may want a high fee for sharing in the risk
of failure of this new product. Having been let into the charmed circle of
the well-informed, they may wish to be paid accordingly. Alternatively, they
may simply be more risk-averse than the innovative producer. The producer
then would find it more advantageous to hire, train and direct employees than
to contract with another firm. By taking all the risk and by exploiting his
information by himself, he need not share his profits with anyone else.
Newness introduces a distributional element into the choice of business
organization that is in addition to the efficiency considerations discussed
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by Weitzman and Williamson.
Finally, the very newness of the product means that its quality needs to
be determined* Perishable products and products requiring repair or service
clearly are subject to quality degradation. It is in the producer's interest
to guarantee a high quality and dispell any uncertainty about it. For in the
presence of uncertainty about the product's quality, the profit-maximizing
quality and profits will be lower. (Shapiro, 1982) But the impact of high
quality on the producer's profits would be an externality for independent
distributors. Indeed there is a positive inducement for fraud if the
consumer or retailer may purchase from someone else the next time around.
(Darby and Kami, 1973) And misreprentation by distributors would lower the
perceived quality of the product. The producer can guarantee quality,
internalize the externality, and make all purchases repeated ones by
integrating forward.
Idiosyncracy similarly makes integration more attractive. Dedicated
distributional resources—whether human or physical—are best coordinated by
a single organization. The freedom to go elsewhere enjoyed by contracting
parties (at the conclusion of a given contract) declines in importance as the
transaction becomes more idiosyncratic and the relevant resources become more
specialized. The cost of negotiating contracts with separate organizations
rises as the requirements for efficient distribution become more complex and
as the situation approaches bilateral monopoly. And if the possession of
specialized talents or resources confers local monopoly power on a wholesaler
or retailer, the producer may want to appropriate the resultant profits
instead of allowing others to retain them.
Very new products and products requiring idiosjrncratio distribution
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networks will be distributed through branch offices (choice C or D, above).
The producing firm will integrate into retailing as well as wholesaling if
the need for specialized services or equipment extends into retail sales.
Products that are less new or have less idiosyncratic distribution needs will
be distributed through franchised firms or similar arrangements (Choice B) .
And old products with non-idiosyncratic distribution requirements will be
sold and resold on open markets (Choice A).
Advertising could either be done by the producer or the distributor. If
there was a one-to-one match of producers and distributors, it might not
matter which one. But the present model assumes that there are more
economies of scale in production than in distribution. Economies of scale in
distribution derive from the idiosyncratic nature of one or more of the
distributional transactions. While important to the analysis, these fixed
costs come in far smaller units than the fixed costs of the continuous-
process manufacturing plant. A typical equilibrium therefore has each
producer distributing through several wholesalers or retailers when using
separate firms. Advertising by any of these firms would generate
considerable externalities, as the advertising increased the overall demand
for the "new" product. Consequently, the producing firm advertises a "new"
product, whether or not it integrates distribution into the producing firm.
IV. Application of the Model
The task now is to show how the model of Section III helps to explain
the events described in Section II. This task will be accomplished in three
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steps. First, we will use the model to show why the various types of
industries described by Chandler adopted different integration strategies.
Second, we will explain the strategies of some industries transformed after
the revolution chronicled by Chandler. And third, we will look for an
explicit test of the model, an exception that proves the rule.
Chandler classified the industries undergoing transformations in the
late nineteenth century into three categories: continuous processes,
perishables, and products requiring customer service. These three classes
can be arrayed along the continuum of newness and idiosyncracy in
distribution.
All three classes of firms produced "new" products, that is, they all
either repackaged or drastically reduced the price of existing products if
they did not actually supply a previously unavailable product. It is hard to
rank these products by newness and, fortunately, not necessary. All of them
had enough newness to make handling them uncertain and therefore to reduce
the number of potential wholesale and retail outlets.
Continuous-production firms had the least idosyncratic transactions in
distribution. Ready-made cigarettes, cheap matches, and ready-to-eat
breakfast cereals were new to the market, but they did not require any
special handling in distribution or special instructions in use. Ordinary
wholesalers and retailers therefore could handle their distribution and sale.
Perishable products involved an idiosyncratic transaction at the wholesale
level. Refrigerated meat and beer had to be kept under refrigeration and
moved expeditiously to the market in order not to spoil. Specialized
equipment (refrigerated railroad cars) and a dedication to a rapid turnover
of inventories were needed for successful distribution, that is, to get the
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products to the market in a fresh enough condition to attract and hold
consumers' interest. Existing wholesalers had neither the equipment nor the
training needed to handle perishable products. The producers consequently-
had to either supply them or find wholesalers who would supply them. In
either case, the wholesalers handling these perishable products were not
interchangeable with other wholesalers; the transaction between the producer
and wholesaler was idiosyncratic.
The makers of products requiring customer service faced an idosyncratic
transaction at the retail level. Sewing machines, mechanical reapers, office
equipment and elevators all required service while in use and some required
training to use in addition. Since there were no existing repair facilities
for these new products, the retailer had to supply them himself to convince
customers to buy the product—since people would not buy without the
assurance that repair and training facilities were available. Producers
consequently had to either organize these facilities themselves or find
retailers who would. In either case, the retailers of these complex products
were not interchangeable with general-purpose merchants; the transaction
between the wholesaler and retailer was idiosyncratic.
It follows from these observations that all three types of firms should
have used quantity signals in their distribution, but that they should have
differed in their degree of forward integration. Continuous-process
manufacturers should have integrated the least, using contractual
arrangements with independent firms to distribute their products (option B,
above). Producers of perishable products should have integrated into
wholesaling (option C), and producers of products requiring customer service
should have integrated forward into retailing as well (option D). As noted
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in Section II, this is what we obsej?ve.
Since the model was constructed to explain the events in Section II, it
is not surprising that it does. In order to decide whether this explanation
is better than some other, we need to subject it to more stringent tests.
The first additional test is to see how it describes industries undergoing
technological transformation more recently.
The computer and the pharmaceutical industries were both transformed
after World War II. As a result of new technologies, they produced new
products which had to be sold. Can this model explain how distribution was
organized in these two industries? Computers, particularly when they were
new, required extensive customer service. They needed repair, and they
needed software. The customers, business firms, in this case, were in no
position to buy computers without accompanying services. As described above
with older forms of office equipment, IBM integrated forward into retailing,
providing all the services that the companies needed.
Pharmaceutical companies began to produce a new generation of antibiotic
and other drugs in the years after World War II. While their manufacturing
costs probably did not have the economies of scale of continuous-process
manufacturers, the importance of the research and development needed to
introduce new drugs allows us to use the asssumptions about cost made in
Section III to approximate costs in the drug industry. The drugs themselves,
while. new, did not have problems of storage or of service. Instructions were
needed for their use, but physicians stood ready to provide them. The law
actually required the physicians' intermediation in the use of the new drugs,
but the doctors did not participate on the actual distribution of them.
Direct dispensing by physicians had virtually disappeared in favor of sale by
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pharmacy. Drug companies consequently were in a position similar to that of
the continuous-process manufacturers before World War I. They packaged their
product and vastly expanded their advertising
—
particularly to doctors. But
they continued to use wholesale and retail druggists to actually distribute
their products. As the model indicates, their integration forward was
important for their success, but limited in its scope. (Temin, 1980)
But again, this is not a hard test. More industries could be found and
described according to this model, fitting them with more or less difficulty
into its framework = It would be nice to have an exception to the rule, a
forward integration when conditions did not warrant it. The model predicts
that such a forward integration would not succeed, that is, it would not
offer advantages over disintegrated distribution and would not therefore
caputure a large market.
American Tobacco tried to build on its success with cigarettes and
expand into cigars. Duke integrated wholesaling and retailing of cigars into
his organization, even though he had not done so with cigarettes. The United
Cigar Store chain of stores was the result. But cigars did not share the
characteristics of cigarettes, much less of sewing machines or typewriters.
Cigars were made by hand by skilled workmen; no continuous-process machine
had been invented. And no new instructions or facilities were needed to sell
or consume cigars. There was, in short, no reason to think that forward
integration offered advantages over a disintegrated market oriented approach.
And apparently, it did not; American Tobacco's share of the cigar market
never exceeded 15 per cent. This is the exception that proves the rule.
(Chandler, 1977, p. 589; Tennant, 1950, pp. 32-33)
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V. Implications
The model of Section III applies most strongly to "new" products, for
the reasons outlined there. It therefore suggests that the value of forward
integration should decline over time as new products become old products and
as the information needed to distribute or service them becomes widespread.
And we do observe some disintegration over time. Independent wholesalers and
retailers emerge where branch offices and franchised dealers were before.
Sewing machines, typewriters, and lately even computers, can be bought in
general-purpose stores. New firms entered the meat-packing business, and the
"Big Four" meat packers' share of commercial cattle slaughter declined from
50 percent in 1920 to 20 percent in 1956. (Yeager, 1981, p. 239)
Nevertheless, many of the large, integrated firms, organized at the end
of the nineteenth century remain dominant in their industries today. The
rate of turnover in the top 100 firms was less than one-third as large after
¥orld War One as in the two decades before. And if firms in the top 100 are
assumed to "survive" if they at least maintain the constant-dollar rate of
growth of assets of the 100th largest firm, the contrast is even stronger.
Only slightly more than one firm a year dropped from the list of the top 100
after the First World War, and less than one a year failed to "survive" under
the looser definition. (Edwards, 1975) Chandler reports that the industrial
location of large firms did not change between 1929 and I960. (Chandler,
1977, p. 370)
Chandler suggests that the integrated organization itself created a
barrier to entry. Manufacturing knowledge was not a barrier, nor were
branding or advertising. "The most imposing barrier to entry in these
- 23 -
industries was the organization the pioneers had built to market and
distribute their newly mass-produced products." (Chandler, 1977, p. 299) But
if manufacturing expertise was not scarce, distributional skill probably wa3
not either. People could be found to handle products competing with the
products of the existing firms. The organization could be duplicated,
therefore. Why then did it pose a barrier to entry?
The most probable explanation involves capital costs. The pioneer firm
had few competitors, possibly none, while building up its distribution
network. It therefore could sell its products at a profit or close to it
while undergoing the initial expansion. Later firms, by contrast, had to
compete against the already existing distributional network. They would
operate at a loss until their networks were fully established.
This argument is not completely convincing. The initial product
development involved great uncertainty. Pioneering firms often had losses as
they experimented with prices and selling techniques. And entrants should
have been able to borrow if the only barrier was the need to copy an
existing, easily described organization. More work needs to be done to
provide an explanation for the continued dominance of the pioneering firms.
In particular, the advantage of being first should not be dismissed so
quickly. Two advantages come to mind. First, a firm that establishes a
reputation for high quality enjoys market power as a result. Studies of the
consumer response to brands suggests that this advantage is strong and '
'
lasting. (Bond and Lean, 1977; Schmalensee, 1979) If these findings are
general, the potential entrant needs to overcome this loyalty advantage in
order to compete successfully with the existing firm. Second, even if
capital markets are functioning well, in the sense that anyone can borrow at
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a price determined by the riskiness of the proposed use, it may be hard to
borrow externally to finance the creation of a large production and
distribution organization. The initial firm, by virtue of its existing
position, may be able to draw on retained earnings to finance expansions,
while the potential entrant has to borrow externally. The existing firm
therefore is not forced to pay a risk premium to a lender outside the
industry who has inadequate knowledge of the profit opportunities. And if
lenders as well as customers are responsive to proven track records, the two
advantages may interact; existing firms may find it easier to borrow as well
as easier to sell their product.
And anticompetitive activity should not be forgotten. Both the American
Tobacco Company and the American Sugar Refining Company required their
distributors to deal exclusively with them. (Tennant, 1950, pp. 304-06;
Eichner, 1969, pp. 191-95) Marvel (1982) argues for an efficiency rationale
for exclusive dealing, but his argument does not apply to either of these
cases which involve homogeneous products and administered prices. Entry
limitation was the motivation and the effect.
The model presented here is a first attempt to formalize the argument
implicit in Chandler's narrative of the managerial revolution of the late
nineteenth century. It provides a basis both to understand the events he
describes and for future research that will illuminate other episodes in our
industrial history.
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